Constitutional Law--Gold Clause Acts--Power of Congress Over Contracts--Extension to Multiple Currency Clauses (The Guaranty Trust Co. of N.Y. v. Berrywood Henwood; The Chemical Bank and Trust Co. of Same, 59 Sup. Ct. 847 (1939) by St. John\u27s Law Review
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 14 
Number 1 Volume 14, November 1939, Number 
1 
Article 13 
August 2013 
Constitutional Law--Gold Clause Acts--Power of Congress Over 
Contracts--Extension to Multiple Currency Clauses (The Guaranty 
Trust Co. of N.Y. v. Berrywood Henwood; The Chemical Bank and 
Trust Co. of Same, 59 Sup. Ct. 847 (1939) 
St. John's Law Review 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
St. John's Law Review (1939) "Constitutional Law--Gold Clause Acts--Power of Congress Over Contracts--
Extension to Multiple Currency Clauses (The Guaranty Trust Co. of N.Y. v. Berrywood Henwood; The 
Chemical Bank and Trust Co. of Same, 59 Sup. Ct. 847 (1939)," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 14 : No. 1 , 
Article 13. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol14/iss1/13 
This Recent Development in New York Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's 
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of 
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
RECENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-GOLD CLAUSE ACTS-POWER OF CON-
GRESS OVER CONTRACTS--EXTENSION TO MULTIPLE CURRENCY
CLAUSES.-In the bankruptcy proceedings of the St. Louis-Southwest-
ern Railway Company, the petitioners submitted a claim for $37,335,-
525.12. Petitioners were trustees of a certain bond and mortgage of
said railroad which gave to the holders the right to demand payment
either in United States gold coin of the value of January 1, 1912, or
its equivalent in value of English pound sterling, Dutch guilder,
French franc, or German mark at that date.' The petitioners in these
proceedings elected to claim the Dutch guilder value at the standard
of gold on January 1, 1912. The referee in bankruptcy reduced this
amount to $21,638,000.00, justifying his action by the present value
of the dollar.2  This was sustained by the lower courts.3  On appeal
to the United States Supreme Court, held, affirmed. The Court
found that the multiple currency clause in the trust mortgages came
within the Joint Resolution of June 5th, 1933, as the bonds were
domestic obligations, and, as such, dischargeable upon payment, dollar
for dollar, in any coin or currency which at the time of payment is
legal tender for public and private debts; that contractual rights of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments were not nullified, as private
parties cannot create vested rights limiting power of Congress in
respect to the monetary policy of the United States. The Guaranty
Trust Co. of N. Y. v. Berryman Henwood; The Chemical Bank and
Trust Co. v. Same, - U. S. -, 59 Sup. Ct. 847 (1939).
The decision in this case is in accord with recent decisions.4 The
"The bonds themselves provided: "St. Louis Southwestern Railway Com-
pany * * * for value received, hereby promises to pay to the bearer, or, if regis-
tered, to the registered holder, of this bond, on the first day of January, 1952,
at its office or agency in the Borough of Manhattan, City and State of New
York, One Thousand Dollars in gold coin of the United States of America, of
or equal to the standard of weight and fineness as it existed January 1, 1912,
or in London, England, f205 15s 2d, or in Amsterdam, Holland, 2490 guilders,
or in Berlin, Germany, marks 4200, D. R. W., or in Paris, France, 5180 francs,
and to pay interest thereon, at the rate of five per cent, per annum, from the
first day of January, 1912, in said respective currencies, semi-annually * *
248 STAT. 112 (1933), 31 U. S. C. §463 (1934).
The Joint Resolution of June 5th, 1933, made the bonds dischargeable by
payment of current legal tender United States money and further stated that
domestic obligations requiring payment in gold or in a particular currency of
fixed valuation are against public policy.
48 STAT. 337, 12 U. S. C. § 212 (1934). Then the President, by an
executive order under the Gold Reserve Act of 1934, fixed the present value of
the dollars. Proclamation 2072, Jan. 31, 1934.
3 98 F. (2d) 160, 179 (C. C. A. 8th, 1939).
Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 294 U. S. 240, 55 Sup. Ct. 407
(1935) (the claimant sought to enforce a payment in gold of the standard of
Feb. 1, 1930, but the Court, holding the Joint Resolution constitutional, said
Congress could establish the value of currency and as such make it legal tender,
outlawing all contract clauses seeking to establish payment on a previous
standard. Nortz v. United States, 294 U. S. 317, 55 Sup. Ct. 415 (1935). The
Court even extended the Joint Resolution to include Government obligations in
the form of gold certificates and made them payable in current legal tender).
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terms of the bonds and mortgages made them domestic obligations 5
and, as such, within the laws relating to them.6 Congress alone has
the right to determine the public policy of the United States in matters
relating to currency and national economy. 7 The Constitution also
gives to Congress the right to make all laws which shall be necessary
and proper for carrying into execution the powers granted.8 In view
of these provisions, it has been held that Congress is authorized to
provide a sound and uniform currency for the country, and to secure
the benefits of it to the people by appropriate legislation.9 The Joint
Resolution of 1933 has been held constitutional in relation to outlaw-
ing the "gold clause" in domestic and foreign bonds,'0 and the Court,
in the instant case, has gone further and declared its constitutionality
where an optional payment in foreign currency is offered, based on a
fixed value of United States gold.
The plaintiff claims that the decision is contrary to the provisions
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,1 as the stipulation for gold
payment was included in the bond and mortgage, creating a property
right and, as such, Congress had no right to interfere or impair the
obligations of the contract. Although Congress -cannot impair the
obligations and interests created by a contract,' 2 it is a well-established
5 The bonds provided that the trustee be a New York trust company;
enforcement of the trust security, collection of bonds and interest, employment
of attorneys, institution of legal proceedings and distribution of assembled assets
were all duties of the New York trustee. Thus, it is obvious that the mortgaged
property, situated in the United States, is subject to the law of the United
States.
Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213 (U. S. 1827); Putchard v. Norton,
106 U. S. 124, 1 Sup. Ct. 102 (1882) ; Liverpool & G. W. Steam Co. v. Phenix
Ins. Co., 129 U. S. 397, 9 Sup. Ct. 469 (1888) ; United States v. North Caro-
lina, 136 U. S. 211, 10 Sup. Ct. 920 (1889).
7 Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533 (U. S. 1869) ; Knox v. Lee, 12 Wall.
457 (U. . 1871).
8 U. S. CONsT. Art. I, § 8; Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3, 3 Sup. Ct. 18
(1883) ("The constitutional power extends to all laws regulating the subject
of currency in every detail and the conduct and transactions of individuals in
respect thereof") ; Norman v. B. & 0. R. R., 294 U. S. 240, 55 Sup. Ct. 407
(1935).
9 Sturgis v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122, 193 (U. S. 1819) ; United States
v. Marigold, 9 How. 560, 568 (U. S. 1850) ; Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533,
549 (U. S. 1869); Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457, 545 (U. S. 1871);
Jiulliard v. Greenman, 110 U. S. 421, 4 Sup. Ct. 122 (1884) ; Ling Su Fan v.
United States, 218 U. S. 302, 31 Sup. Ct. 21 (1910).
10 Norman v. B. & 0. R. R., 294 U. S. 240, 55 Sup. Ct. 407 (1935), aff'g,
265 N. Y. 37, 191 N. E. 226 (1934) ; Holyoke Water Power Co. v. American
Writing Paper Co., 300 U. S. 324, 57 Sup. Ct. 485 (1937), rev'g, Emery Bird
Thayer Dry Goods Co. v. Williams, 15 F. Supp. 938 (W. D. Mo. 1936).
13 U. S. CONsT. Amend. V ("No person * * * shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law") ; U. S. CoNsT. Amend. XIV
("No state shall deprive any citizen of life, liberty or property without due
process of law").
12 Highland v. Russell Car & Snow Plow Co., 279 U. S. 253, 49 Sup. Ct.
314 (1929), citing Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 161, 28 Sup. Ct. 277
(1908) ("Generally speaking, the right to enter into and carry out contracts in
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principle that such liberty of contract is not absolute or universal, and
that Congress may regulate the making and performance of such con-
tracts whenever reasonably necessary to insure the furtherance of the
sovereignty and power of the National Government.13 The Constitu-
tion only limits the powers of the states over contracts and does not
control the power of Congress or the United States.14  Congress has
often exercised its power over contracts by appropriate legislation.
Congressional control over money has even been held valid when
applied to limiting already existing contracts. 15 Contracts are made
in reference to a possible exercise of the rightful authority of the Gov-
ernment and no obilgation of a contract can defeat that power. It is
because of the authority of Congress over currency that there attaches
to the ownership, or the right to ownership of gold and silver, certain
limitations which public policy requires, since it is used as legal tender
and as a medium of exchange. 16
The argument against Congress exercising its implied constitu-
tional power to impair contracts is based in main on the hardship
and loss resulting from the destruction of property rights created by
the obligation and, consequently, Congress would, in effect, be regulat-
ing contracts and not currency. But harshness of legislation, or the
hardship resulting to certain persons, is no reason for declaring an
act unconstitutional. 17 Necessity alone is the determiner of the justi-
respect of one's property and private affairs is protected by the due process
clause of the 5th and 14th Amendments of the Constitution").
23 McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (U. S. 1819) ("Congress has the
power to pass appropriate legislation to achieve the great objects for which the
government was framed * * * to create a national government with sovereign
powers") ; Baltimore & 0. R. R. v. Interstate Commerce Comm., 221 U. S. 612,
31 Sup. Ct. 716 (1911); Highland v. Russell Car & Snow Plow Co., 279 U. S.
253, 49 Sup. Ct. 314 (1929), citing Frisbie v. United States, 157 U. S. 160,
15 Sup. Ct. 586 (1895).
14 Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457, 529 (U. S. 1871); Louisville & W.
R. R. v. Mottley, 219 U. S. 467, 31 Sup. Ct. 265 (1911) ; New York v. United
States, 257 U. S. 591, 42 Sup. Ct. 439 (1922); Home Bldg. & Loan Assn. v.
Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 54 Sup. Ct. 231 (1934).
1s Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122, 200 (U. S. 1819) ; Legal Tender
Cases, 12 Wall. 457, 544 (U. S. 1871), overriding Hepburn v. Griswold, 8 Wall.
603 (U. S. 1870). See also Dooley v. Smith, 13 Wall. 604 (U. S. 1872);
Norwich & W. R. R. v. Johnson, 15 Wall. 195 (U. S. 1873); Bernheimer v.
Converse, 206 U. S. 516, 27 Sup. Ct. 755 (1907) ("Without impairing the obli-
gation of the contract, the remedy may certainly be modified as the wisdom of
the national shall direct").
The Joint Resolution does affect the fulfillment of a contract.
The Legal Tender Acts, which were passed during the Civil War, 12 STAT.
345 (1862), 31 U. S. C. § 452 (1934), made the United States notes lawful
money and legal tender in payment of all debts, public and private, within the
United States, affected the fulfillment of contracts when they were passed.
Congress also has the right to pass bankruptcy acts, non-intercourse acts,
declare an embargo or declare war, all of which operate seriously upon existing
contracts.
16 Ling Su Fan v. United States, 218 U. S. 302, 310, 31 Sup. Ct. 21 (1910).
17 Norman v. B. & 0. R. R., 294 U. S. 240, 55 Sup. Ct. 407 (1935) (holding
valid the repeal of the "gold clause" as applied to a private contract).
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fication of an abridgement of a contract. 18 Congress has always deter-
mined the policy, which must not be confused with the judicial right
to determine power.19
The wording of the bonds, while perfectly legal at the time they
were written, show that the makers intended to prevent loss if Con-
gress altered the value of gold. The Court, in the instant case, has
seen through the subterfuge and extended its ruling in the Gold
Clause cases to cover optional bonds and thus defeating the obvious at-
tempt to nullify the Gold Clause Acts. The Court points to the Senate
report on the Resolution which shows the intention of Congress to
prevent such a result.20 The Courts, having previously recognized
the Congressional power in relation to the United States monetary
policy, 21 were consistent in affirming the decision of the lower courts.
Gold coin is no longer recognized as legal tender and the obligation of
the contract to pay money is governed by that which the law shall
recognize as money.22 The Joint Resolution and subsequent legisla-
tion stated what was to be recognized as legal tender for all domestic
obligations. The bonds and mortgages in the instant case were found
to be domestic obligations that came within the law.
23
R. M. P.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-MuLTIPLE INHERITANCE TAXATION-
DETERMINATION OF DOMICILE BY SUPREME CouRT.-This action, in
the nature of a bill of interpleader, was brought in the Supreme Court
by the State of Texas against the states of Florida, New York and
Massachusetts, to determine the domicile of the decedent, Edward H.
R. Green, who died leaving an estate which included intangibles ag-
gregating more than $35,000,000. The court's jurisdiction was based
on allegations that each state claimed to be deceased's domicile for
taxing purposes, and that the total sum of the claims of each state
and the Federal Government would far exceed the total value of the
estate, thereby jeopardizing plaintiff's attempt to collect its taxes.
The court appointed a special master,' who found that decedent, at
Is Wollf Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 262 U. S. 522,
43 Sup. Ct. 630 (1923).19 Chicago, B. & 0. R. R. v. McGuire, 219 U. S. 549, 31 Sup. Ct. 259
(1911).
20 SEN. REP. No. 99, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933) ("Additional and imme-
diate legislation is necessary to remove the disturbing effect of this uncertainty
and to insure the success of the policy by closing possible legal loopholes and
removing inconsistencies").
21 Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457 (U. S. 1871).
22 Faw v. Marstitler, 2 Cranch 1, 29, 32 (U. S. 1804).
23 See notes 6, 7, supra.
1301 U. S. 671, 57 Sup. Ct. 935 (1936).
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